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INTRODUCTION: SYMPOSIUM ON
EXPLORING POWER, AGENCY & ACTION
IN A WORLD OF MOVING FRONTIERS
By Bryant G. Garth*

I am pleased to introduce this symposium on “Exploring Power,
Agency & Action in a World of Moving Frontiers.” The symposium
represents a new take on issues that have haunted legal scholars and
lawyers, especially those activists who moved into the legal field in order to
be in a position to champion a progressive agenda. Legal institutions and
indeed legal training lead such social change advocacy to proceed through
efforts to create, extend, and support legal rights. To be sure, many
historical accounts of social change in the United States draw on the
purported successes of various “rights revolutions.” For many reasons,
however, as the authors point out, this legalized process of change waters
down and puts limits on a social change agenda and constricts the social
movements that idealistic legal scholars seek to champion. The symposium
examines ways to confront and perhaps avoid this dilemma.
As background for the Law and Society panel on which this
symposium is based, the organizers offered the following set of questions:
“What effects do the demands for legal equality emerging from many
resistance movements have and what are their dangers? How might they
reinscribe/mediate/contest categories like “citizen,” “human,” “rights,”
“family,” “eligible beneficiary,” “woman,” “criminal,” etc.? Alternatively,
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what would a commitment to radical justice (that engaged the politics of
social identities) that did not take recourse to rights or equality paradigms
look like? Most concretely, what kind of claims, demands, categories and
practices (legal and otherwise) would we/could we take up/use to pursue the
collective work of justice in light of and in lieu of the critiques of
liberalism, citizenship, and rights? That is, do we have a sense of
alternatives within contemporary discourses?”
The disillusionment of legal scholars with the rights strategy is not
new. The rise of Critical Legal Studies in the late 1970s and early 1980s, in
particular, was largely a scholarly reflection on the limits of the liberal
legalism identified with the civil rights movement. The questions raised
above, in fact, could have been the subject of a CLS panel. But there is a
freshness of the responses in this symposium. Each author grapples with
the promise and the limits of the rights strategy with a different perspective.
The articles therefore merit a careful reading, and I cannot pretend to
summarize them in this brief introduction.
Professor Hart begins the symposium with the issue of the limits of
legal language. The terms that are used to signify social change such as
same-sex marriage or equal opportunity, she points out, also connote
relatively narrow and conservative agendas. Only an understanding of the
context for the use can tell what is meant in a particular situation, and often
the user of the terms fails to take into account how narrowly it will be
construed. Professor Hart recognizes that the problem cannot be solved
simply, but suggests that we all need to be very careful about which terms
we use and which meanings we assign to them. Our own agency – even if
embedded in the legal structures – then has more of a chance to be
exercised.
Professor Ramachandran takes up and reiterates the critique of rights
and formal legal equality. Recognizing that the language of rights must be
reckoned with, she seeks to find a way external to law to ground particular
legal policies. She looks to science as one way to constrain and perhaps
even enliven legal policies. It is a bold initiative, and lawyers and judges
may be loath to cede their power to scientists; but she makes a strong case
that social policy has moved so far in the direction of pure ideology that
science might provide one way out. The case is all the more compelling as
our social policies endanger the planet.
Professor Bloom wants to keep the agenda focused on rights, but her
innovation is to promote tort lawyering that will confront what she and
others term biopower. She wants to move away from dominant narratives of
idealized bodily truths proffered by medical elites. In contrast to Professor
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Ramachandran, she favors a more personal narrative to resist what she sees
as entrapment in the dominant narratives sustained by elite science.
Professor Rasmussen examines the area of animal rights as a kind of
test case. She explores the possibilities of rights-based language as a way to
improve the situation for animals more generally. She carefully argues that
what appears to be progress through a legal- and rights-based strategy
rationalizes violence against animals, reinforces a hierarchy that puts
humans at the top and makes humans the measure of other creatures, and
avoids issues of power and inequity. She does not provide a solution to this
problem, but she makes the situation very clear.
Professor Kandaswamy pushes the critique further, seeking to “sever
the hold” of law on the political imagination. She uses the example of the
emancipation of slaves after the Civil War to show that legalized freedom
meant only “freedom to the rubrics of liberal individualism and contract.”
She seeks therefore to avoid the limitations of legal categories by, in
particular, focusing struggles “around specific harms.” Her approach comes
close to rejecting the rights strategy.
Finally, Professor Reddy focuses not so much on rights but on related
processes of reinforcing the status quo through the enactment of social
norms. His example is the issue of grieving for suicides committed by gay
teens. The public mourning of such suicides is part of the process of
reinforcing categories that promote stereotypes and limit progressive
change. The only way to transcend the pre-figured categories, he suggests,
is to “engage with ungrievable life” – to somehow step out of the
categories.
None of the articles provides a simple answer. From my more
sociological perspective, the paradox is that what attracts people to the law
is what limits their possibilities. Law in the United States contains the
structures of power – in two senses. First, the power of law comes not from
the law as such but from the power that is embedded in it over time. Absent
some major social crisis, playing to the law in the United States is a way to
craft a potentially winning strategy. It is hard to move ahead by severing the
hold of law or stepping out of conventional categories (or rejecting
conventional medical understandings). Second, law contains the structures
by providing rules that limit the freedom of the powerful to do whatever
they want but at the same time ensure that the powerful will not lose their
position. Activists in the United States inside the law confront this dilemma,
and activists from outside the law are also drawn to law (and the same
dilemma) because they seek to gain the support of law (and what is
embedded in it) to advance their agendas. The history of the rise and fall of
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welfare rights is a perfect example of this situation.1 In the absence of major
crises that shake up the system and change the power structure, change is
managed in this way.
At the risk of overdoing the sociological analysis, one might say also
that the attraction of idealists into the legal field serves to perpetuate this.
Each generation of scholars makes the law more relevant to actors seeking
social change by denouncing efforts to make social change narrowly
through law. In this way, social movements and activists will be more likely
to ally with legal actors who recognize the limits of the law – but still
cannot avoid them. Movements in this way are channeled more effectively
into law than they would if legal scholars pretended that rights solved all
problems.
This account may appear to be an expression of cynicism about social
change through law. I do not think that is the case. In fact, the constant
criticism of the limits of law moves the law to absorb the criticism and in
the process change – even if much more slowly than activists want. The
suggestions of critical scholars are not wasted efforts. They provide fresh
avenues to challenge, occasionally subvert, and gain some strength through
the knowledge of what the pull of law and rights will do. More importantly
from my perspective, they renew the pressure on law and legal institutions
to at least take into account what is being argued, and that pressure may
bring some needed change. The change may be quite incremental, and it
may not threaten the holders of power, but it still counts. Further, in times
of crisis, bolder arguments may gain more traction even if – which may be a
positive – they are still somewhat domesticated through the law.

1. See generally, FELICIA KORNBLUH, THE BATTLE FOR WELFARE RIGHTS: POLITICS AND
POVERTY IN MODERN AMERICA (2007).

